Welcoem to posts!!
in the future - u will be able to do some more stuff here,,,!! like pat catgirl- i mean um yeah... for now u can only see others's posts :c
Here is a recap of this channel's 2024 numbers:
1,309 - New subscribers
646.7K - Views
48 - Uploads
6,936 - Likes
590 - Comments
1,866 - Shares
Thanks to all of you for tuning in!
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About 50 more videos coming in early 2025! (and even more after that...). I will endeavor to release about one per week.
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These films are from the History Division of United State Marine Corps. The films are digitized and made available to the public through a partnership between the History Division and the University of South Carolina. They are preserving and digitizing over 19,000 cans of USMC films without federal (or state) dollars--almost entirely through philanthropic donations. They are about two thirds through this large and expensive undertaking.
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There will be a gap in film/video release as I am limited on the number of digitized films I can procure. All of this year's films have already been released and uploaded.
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More great info from the US Marine Corp Historical Reports:
Immediately after the formation of Marine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac, its squadrons began training at the Marine Corps air stations at Mojave and Santa Barbara, California. In accordance with CominCh instructions, a Commencement Bay-class CVE was made available on the west coast to permit the pilots to train for carrier qualification. Four CVEs were to be in operation by 15 February 1945. Each ship was to have an air complement consisting of a VMF (CVS) with 18 Corsairs and Hellcats, and a VMTB (CVS) with 12 Avengers.
This aircraft strength figure was not adhered to, however, for MCVG-1 on the Block Island had "12 TBM, 10 F4U, 8 F6F night fighters and 2 F6F planes, planes, "because the Block Island was equipped with an SP (height finder) radar suitable for night intercepts, hence the day-night character of her assigned air group."48 The MCVG-4 air complement on the Cape Gloucester consisted of 12 TBMs, 16 F4Us, and 2 F6F photo planes. By careful spotting of the aircraft on the carrier deck, it was found that two additional F4Us could be added to the strength of the group, and when it passed through Hawaii en route to the West Pacific, the Cape Gloucester took on board these two extra planes to give it a total of 32 operating aircraft.
Before going on board the carriers, the Marine fliers underwent the same type of carrier training that Navy pilots experienced. The training of the Marines additionally emphasized the tactics and techniques to be employed during close support missions. Besides taking part in the regular squadron training program, the new carrier pilots had to learn or refresh their knowledge of the following subjects: communications and flight deck procedures; recognition, survival and first aid; map reading and navigation; ordnance and gunnery; and escape from submerged aircraft procedures effected from a training device called a "Dilbert Dunker." Subjects included in the flight training syllabus were air tactics, night flying, carrier landings, rocket firing, navigation, fixed and free gunnery, and bombing. The flight syllabus for VMTB pilots and crews also included radar search and torpedo drops. Once the squadrons were assigned to the CVEs, as part of their shakedown preparations, the pilots had to make eight satisfactory carrier landings to become fully qualified. It was during this period, when the squadrons were training on the CVEs, that a considerable number of operational accidents occurred. These were caused by a combination of pilot error and aircraft failure arising almost directly out of the design of the F4U-1s and F4U-1Ds, the Corsairs, flown by Marine fighter squadrons and the flight deck characteristics of the carriers. In comparison with the much larger and faster CVs, the Commencement Bay-class escort carriers made a top speed of only 19 knots, and had flight decks that were only 75 feet wide and 553 feet long.
The length of both Corsair models was slightly more than 33 feet and their wing span was nearly 41 feet. Both F4U types were powered by 2,000-horsepower Pratt and Whitney radial engines. Driving a three-bladed propeller slightly more than 13 feet in diameter, these powerful Corsairs were the first naval aircraft operating in the war with a speed capability in excess of 400 miles per hour. In the opinion of one Marine ace who flew the plane in the Pacific: "The Corsair was a fine carrier plane, and most of us preferred it to the F6F. It was always called 'The Bent Wing Widowmaker.'"
The cockpit of the Corsair lay well back in the fuselage, behind a long nose, which severely limited the vision of the pilot while the plane was in a landing attitude. The inverted, low gull wing located forward of and below the pilot restricted his vision during the critical carrier landing approach. The high torque characteristics of the engine, that is, the tendency of the plane to roll to the left and sometimes out of control if power was applied when the plane was traveling at slow speeds, gave the pilot a very small margin of error. In land-based operations, hard right rudder and judicious application of full throttle when the plane was taking off, landing, or being waved off were required; aboard the small carriers, these aircraft-handling techniques became even more critical.
Despite the aversion of the Navy to use of Corsairs on carriers, many changes had been made in the plane which made it suitable for such employment. These included:
. . . raising the pilot's cabin to improve visibility (November 1942 ), improved aileron action (January 1943), larger bearings in the tail wheels (March 1943), installation of a spoiler on right wing to reduce violence of stalls when under acceleration and to provide new stall warning (November 1943) , new oleo strut-filling procedure (May 1944).
The relative inexperience of the new MCVG pilots in CVE landing operations and the inherent difficulty in flying the Corsair resulted in numerous other training and operational accidents. Although the average number of carrier landings required for pilot qualification was 8, a Corsair pilot had to make a minimum of 20-25 before he could attain a realistic proficiency level.
Takeoffs from the carrier while at sea were the source of another major problem to the Corsair pilots. At best, the top speed of the CVE would provide only 19-1/2 knots of headwind on a calm day. Under optimum takeoff conditions, the Corsairs required a minimum headwind of from 20 to 26 knots; a 30-knot headwind was ideal. Unless optimum wind and speed conditions existed, a Corsair, heavily laden with bombs, rockets, armament, and fuel could not attain flying speed and would drop off the end of the flight deck into the sea ahead of the carrier. For this reason, the F4Us were launched by catapult in almost every case.
Lieutenant Colonel Royce W. Coln's MCVG-3 pilots on USS Vella Gulf soon found:
". . . that in practically any external load condition the risk was too unfavorable to try a fly away launch with the F4U. We therefore immediately adopted a SOP that all F4Us and F6Fs [launched] would be catapult shots rather than fly aways. TBMs which were usually spotted all the way aft and under 28-30 knots relative wind with a 2000 pound internal load could fly off with reasonable safety. We also found that with this system we could do a total launch of all aircraft in much less time."
MCVG-1 Corsairs on the Block Island were "almost always catapulted," for the carrier "had two Cats. An H4 on the Port and an H2 on the Starboard bow. The H4 gave you a 4G slam and was the greatest feeling a pilot ever had, especially on a black night. You knew you were going all the way the minute you felt it."
Sometimes the hydraulic-powered catapults failed to accelerate the aircraft to flying speed by the time the Corsair left the flight deck--a "cold-cat shot" in carrier pilot's parlance. In those cases, the pilot often was unable to keep the tail of his plane from dragging. If he could not gain the required flying speed, the plane would "mush" right into the water directly in the path of the sharp-prowed carrier before the pilot could extricate himself from his Corsair. It was in these cases that Dilbert Dunker training proved its worth. More often than not, however, pilot and plane were lost. Despite the occurrence of these shake-down problems, the CVE program was soundly launched.
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I get asked about the circumstance of the emergence of the Corsair on these smaller and slower Escort Carriers. Many searches on this subject shed little information until I ran across this historical report from the US Marine Corp. Here is a relevant excerpt:
"Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who became Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1 January 1944, also was concerned with the status of his air units and had consulted with Admiral King regarding the future employment of those squadrons and pilots sitting in the backwash of the war on South Pacific islands. He proposed that one of the five wings be eliminated, but also argued that to employ the fliers and planes based in the rear areas of the South and Central Pacific gainfully Marine pilots should be assigned to carriers. King agreed in principle to this compromise, but stated that Nimitz' approval had to be gained before any final action could be taken.
A desire to visit his Marines in the Pacific as well as to determine at first hand the facts surrounding the Saipan command controversy impelled General Vandegrift in late July 1944 to make an inspection trip, in which he covered:
. . . 22,000 miles in eighteen days, saw all the force, corps, and division commanders and practically all the regimental and battalion commanders in the field, I went to Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, getting to Guam just before the show was over. Our people did a superb job on all three of those islands, the fighting on all three of them being entirely different. . . .
I went from Guam to Kwajalein to Guadalcanal then up to the Russells to see my old division and to Bougainvillea to see Ralph Mitchell and his crowd. Then back to Pearl for a three-day session with Nimitz.
Accompanying the Commandant were Brigadier Generals Field Harris--the newly appointed Director of Aviation--and Gerald C. Thomas, the Director, Division of Plans and Policies. Upon their return to Pearl, they went into conference with Nimitz, Vice Admiral John H. Tower, Deputy CinCPac-CinCPOA, Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Nimitz' deputy chief of staff and head of his War Plans Division, and Major General Ross E. Rowell, since 1941 head of MAWPac (the forerunner of AirFMFPac). The decisions they made in the course of these talks determined the course that Marine aviation was to take in the Pacific for the remainder of the war.
Vandegrift broached the subject of the future employment of Marine squadrons, and informed Nimitz of what had been said in the course of conversations about the matter with CominCh, especially the recommendation that Marines be assigned to carriers. Although Towers argued that there had been no indication in the past that Marines wanted to operate from carriers, Vandegrift and Harris persuaded him that times and attitudes had changed.
It was agreed at this conference that the primary mission of Marine Corps aviation was to support the Marine ground forces and to participate in amphibious assaults. Therefore, in order to focus the activities of Marine aviation on its mission more effectively, the following package of proposals submitted to Admiral King were concurred in by Nimitz with an endorsement stating that it would "more firmly integrate Marine Corps aviation within the Marine Corps and is therefore in the interest of the naval service."
Essentially, it was recommended that a complement of Marine squadrons to be employed in the close support of amphibious operations be assigned to one CVE division of six Commencement Bay-class carriers. This complement was to consist of six 18-plane fighter (F4U or F6F aircraft) and six 12-plane torpedo bomber squadrons whose pilots were to be specially trained in the use of rockets with which their planes were to be armed. It was further recommended that a Marine aviator of suitable rank be directed to organize and prepare these squadrons for carrier operations. He later would be assigned to duty on the carrier division staff.
Concerning another aspect of the Marine aviation problem, the conferees agreed that Marine aviation should gradually take over the responsibility for controlling aircraft in direct support of ground troops in amphibious operations. Gradually, and as practicably as possible without impairing the conduct of combat operations then in process, Marine Corps personnel would replace their Navy counterparts in the existing Air Support Control Unit organizations.
One other recommended change was to effect the reorganization of Marine aviation in the Pacific, wherein Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, would become Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in order to identify the Marine air components more closely with the ground elements. This proposal also established the relationship of AirFMFPac with ComAirPac and FMFPac under the overall command of CinCPac.
In addition, the strength and composition of Marine aviation forces in the Pacific was to undergo change. Hereafter, MAGs would be comprised of three 24-plane squadrons instead of four 18-plane squadrons, and the number of Air Warning Squadrons would be cut from 32 to 24 or less in view of the number of Army units of the same type that were scheduled to arrive in the Pacific for future operations.
General Vandegrift signed the basic memorandum listing the proposed recommendations and stated in the last paragraph of this report that "Every effort will be made to increase the mobility and effectiveness of marine aviation by accomplishing such readjustments of personnel and equipment among Headquarters, Service and Tactical
Squadrons as may be indicated." Admiral King approved the proposals on 10 September 1944 with the proviso that when Army Air Forces units were available in the Pacific to replace certain Marine Corps aviation squadrons, Marine Corps aviation strength would be reduced by or up to the equivalent of one wing. In a bucktag comment on the conference proposals, Admiral King wrote: "Good, but does not go far enough towards reducing MarCorps aviation." In notifying General Holcomb of what had transpired regarding the future of Marine Corps aviation, General Vandegrift wrote:
"Another thing we have done, which I pinch myself now and then to see if I am still awake, we have gotten both Nimitz and King to approve a division of the larger CVEs for use of Marines. That will give us four carriers with a carrier group of Marines aboard, and I can assure you that took some days of hard talking."
Following up the approval of CominCh for placing Marine planes on carriers, on 28 October 1944, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the formation of the Marine Air Support Division. To comprise this organization, the Commandant of the Marine Corps selected MAG-51, MBDAG-48, and the following squadrons: VMO-351, VMF-112, -511, -512, -513, and -514, and VMTB-132, -143, -144, -233, -234, and -454. All of these units were attached to Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, (MarFAirWest) at San Diego and were redesignated as follows: MAG-51 became MASG48 (Marine Air Support Group), and MBDAG-48 similarly became MASG-51. All of the squadrons attached to these groups were further identified with the following letters "CVS," meaning Carrier Support, as VMF(CVS)-112.
The overall designation given to the all-Marine carrier force was Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The next subordinate echelon to this was the MASG, which was comprised of the fighter and torpedo bomber squadrons for a CVE division of six ships. Each of the escort carriers, in turn, was to have as its air complement a Marine Carrier Group (MCVG) consisting of a Marine Carrier Aircraft Service Detachment (MCASD), a VMF(CVS), and a VMTB(CVS)."
You can see that the squadrons I am showing in these films are listed in this first groups...and they were all assigned Corsairs, Hellcats and Avengers. Incidentally, VMO-351 was later redesigned VMF-351. These crews went on to become the first Marine Squadrons to operate from Escort Carriers in the Pacific theater during WW2. There were four Escort Carriers that started this new program:
CVE-106 USS Block Island with squadrons VMTB-233 and VMF-511
CVE-107 USS Gilbert Islands with squadrons VMTB-143 and VMF-512
CVE-109 USS Cape Gloucester with squadrons VMTB-132 and VMF-351
CVE-111 USS Vella Gulf with squadrons VMTB-234 and VMF-513
VMF-514 was assigned to the Escort Carrier USS Salerno Bay and VMTB-454 was assigned to the USS Puget Sound. Both squadrons were deployed late for the war and were deactivated shortly thereafter.
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Just a little bit of backstory - I have my Father In Law's logbook and I found the following information:
He started flight training for the Marines in January 1943 at the age of 21.
He solo'd a N2S-4 after 11.3 hours of training.
He went on to fly OS2Us and SBDs in his assignment to VMS-3 based on St. Thomas Island.
His first flight in a TBM was in June 1944 after about 550 hours.
On March 9, 1945 he made his first 4 carrier landings in 0.8 hours on CVE-107 in a TBM in the Santa Barbara area after about 800 hours of flying.
On April 22, 1945 he made 6 carrier landings in 3.0 hours to be carrier qualified in the TBM in the Pearl Harbor area after about 850 hours of flying.
His first wartime attack mission was on May 27th, 1945 against Okinawa after about 890 hours of flying.
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I wanted to give a little more background on the origin of these films. I found some information in a document from a hobby historian located in Goleta. It gives a background on Marine's reasoning behind their efforts. Key people involved later went on to careers in Hollywood:
Winston Miller
Sidney Salkow
William Whitney
John Blunk
Eugene Moriarty
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Please bear with me as I make adjustments to some of the videos...the process of editing is a new skill for me and I am seeing better ways to present the films.
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This channel is dedicated to these four WWII escort carriers and their squadrons:
CVE-106 USS Block Island - VMTB-233 and VMF-511
CVE-107 USS Gilbert Islands - VMTB-143 and VMF-512
CVE--109 USS Cape Gloucester - VMTB-132 and VMF-351
CVE-111 USS Vella Gulf - VMTB-234 and VMF-513
These were the first US Marine Corp escort Carriers carrying the Corsair in addition to the Hellcat and the Avenger.
Through researching the subject I came across over 100+ archive color films that the Marine Corp documented by having film crews embedded with the squadrons. Captured on colored film were the flight crew training of the new mission tactics, the daily life of men aboard the carrier, and mission specific operations.
My motivation for undertaking this project is my connection to my Father in Law who was a pilot assigned to VMTB-143 aboard CVE-107 USS Gilbert Islands.
#WW2FighterPilot #WW2Aircraft Carrier #WW2History #WW2FighterPilotTraining #WW2Color #WW2