COGNITIVE BIAS, THE AXIOLOGICAL QUESTION AND
THE EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY OF THEISTIC BELIEF
Daniel Linford & Jason Megill
Forthcoming. Ontology of Theistic Beliefs: Meta-Ontological Perspectives. Edited by
Miroslaw Szatkowski. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
The philosophy of religion addresses what can be called the “axiological
question,” i.e., regardless of whether God exists, would it be good or bad if God exists? Would
the existence of God make the world a better or a worse place? Call the view that the existence
of God would make the world a better place “Pro-Theism.” We argue that Pro-Theism is not
implausible, and moreover, many Theists, at least, (often implicitly) think that it is true.
We then argue that, as a result of certain cognitive biases that result
when good outcomes might be at stake, Pro-Theism causes many Theists to inflate the epistemic
probability that God exists, and as a result, Theists should lower the probability they assign to
God’s existence.