https://www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability
secure second strike, the ability, after being struck by a nuclear attack, to strike back with nuclear weapons and cause massive damage to the enemy. Secure second strike capability was seen as a key nuclear deterrent during the Cold War.The strategy also partially explained the extraordinarily high number of nuclear weapons maintained by both the United States and the Soviet Union during the

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_strike
In nuclear strategy, a retaliatory strike or second-strike capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. To have such an ability (and to convince an opponent of its viability) is considered vital in nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the other side might attempt to try to win a nuclear war in one massive first

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150
Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn.

https://armscontrolcenter.org/factsheet-the-nuclear-triad/
The argument is that the Triad enables a second-strike capability — the ability to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack — as each leg is a hedge against the failure of another. However, a debate has emerged among lawmakers and policy experts about whether the land-based leg of the Triad is still necessary or desirable.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/requirements-for-nuclear-deterrence-and-arms-control-in-a-two-peer-nuclear-peer-environment/
These collective challenges posed by the future two-peer threat environment have important impacts on US future deterrence and assurance requirements. A Patriot M903 launcher station at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. ... When facing a peer nuclear adversary with a secure second-strike capability that poses an existential threat to the United

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150
ines and mobile missiles. These efforts achieved important and under-appreciated success. Second strike forces have been far more vulnerable than most analysts are willing to credit. KEY WORDS: Nuclear Strategy, Intelligence, Counterforce, Mobile Targets, Secure Second Strike One of the central concepts in nuclear analysis is the 'secure second

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3786326/us-needs-sea-based-nuclear-capability-to-ensure-second-strike-capability/
The U.S. needs all three legs of its nuclear triad, including land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched cruise missiles and its sea-based weapons to guarantee a second-strike

https://tnsr.org/2021/10/the-standstill-conundrum-the-advent-of-second-strike-vulnerability-and-options-to-address-it/
Emerging and disruptive technologies spell an uncertain future for second-strike retaliatory forces. New sensors and big data analysis may render mobile missiles and submarines vulnerable to detection. I call this development the "standstill conundrum": States will no longer be able to assure a nuclear response should they be hit by a nuclear first strike. If the nuclear weapons states can

https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/fulfilling-central-enduring-role-u-s-nuclear-weapons/
An important purpose of the Nuclear Posture Review is to articulate U.S. policy for fulfilling this enduring role. ... The concept of a survivable second-strike capability is straightforward, but sustaining a survivable second-strike capability decades into an uncertain future is a complex undertaking. Any number of unwelcome developments could

https://study.com/academy/lesson/second-strike-capability-history-facts.html
During the Cold War, second-strike capability was seen as a key element of nuclear deterrence and was an important aspect of the relative balance of power between the United States and the Soviet

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb361/
The concept of a "survivable second strike force" is important to the history of nuclear deterrence by demonstrating the futility and risk of a first strike and preemptive attacks. The chapter on a "survivable second strike force" gives credit to RAND and the 1955 Killian Report for stimulating thinking along those lines, but credit should also

https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/no-first-use/no-first-use-myths-vs-realities/
The credible U.S. second-strike capability is and will remain a deterrent to nuclear attack, but the threat of nuclear preemption is unnecessary and dangerous. If nuclear-armed adversaries believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons first, they will be incentivized to use their nuclear weapons before a devastating U.S. strike

https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/17/when-nuclear-superiority-isn-t-superior-revisiting-nuclear-balance-of-power-pub-90782
The second lesson—that nuclear superiority can prove disadvantageous—may be more of a mixed blessing. ... We also factor in whether states have a nuclear second-strike capability—that all-important ability to retaliate even after being attacked—by identifying whether the state in question has submarine-launched ballistic missiles

https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/events/re-inventing-vulnerability-securing-second-strike-era-high-accuracy-sensing-lindsay-rand
However, there has been remarkably little detailed, technical analysis to verify, refute, or qualify these claims. Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus around what type of capability would truly render a second strike vulnerable, injecting ambiguity into and ultimately constraining efforts to anticipate the disruption of new technologies.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Brodie_(military_strategist)
The building of protected missile silos around the United States is a testament to that belief. It was important for the second-strike force to have first-strike capabilities to provide the stasis necessary for deterrence. Brodie believed that the second-strike force should be targeted towards not cities but military installations.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/value-and-limits-nuclear-deterrence
Specific to regional nuclear powers (which include China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and France), Vipin Narang, a professor of nuclear security at MIT, identifies three possible nuclear postures: "catalytic"; "assured retaliation"; and "asymmetric escalation.". Each of these describes a distinct approach to nuclear

https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/TNSR-Journal-Vol-4-Issue-4-Gottemoeller.pdf
— a second strike. The ability to successfully re-taliate even after a devastating first nuclear strike has long been seen as that vital insurance policy and a cornerstone of strategic stability. Because of this, each side suspects the other of being on a long quest to undo the second-strike retaliatory capabil-ity of the other side.

https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/china-s-nuclear-doctrine-debates-and-evolution-pub-63967
Because ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most important second-strike force, China can have better nuclear retaliation capability and be more confident about its no-first-use policy if it improves its SSBNs. China's policy for employing nuclear weapons is only in self-defense and retaliation. China has persisted in the principle

https://fas.org/publication/submarine-upgrades-russia/
Submarines play a key role in Russia's deterrence strategy, given that their stealth and survivability provide an important second-strike capability. The recent commissioning of new nuclear-powered submarines into the Pacific Fleet is a part of a larger modernization campaign as Russia's older submarines begin to reach the ends of their

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2024.2351500
Long-range strike weapons (LRS) are a category of conventional weapon systems that employ advanced technologies to deliver a conventional payload at stand-off range and with high precision. 1 The meaning of 'stand-off range' is context-dependent, relating to the geographical distance between adversaries, but generally denotes the ability of

https://www.eurasiareview.com/25042022-second-strike-capability-pakistans-babur-3-versus-indias-ins-arihant-analysis/
The Babur 3 missile is claimed as the main component of Pakistan's second strike capability. The operational range of Babur 3 is 450km, which means it can reach the coastal cities of India but

https://www.survivalistboards.com/threads/how-important-is-second-strike-capable-to-you-in-your-gun.844674/
A 2nd strike is probably slower and LESS certain than ejecting the bad round and moving on to the next. I can only see it being an issue if it's the LAST round, or you are unable to do the action. In decades of shooting I've never had a premium SD round fail to ignite (or I certainly cannot recall an instance).

https://www.iowapublicradio.org/health/2024-06-24/women-across-the-country-strike-two-years-after-dobbs
In the United States, women disproportionately provide free labor that keeps households, families and communities functioning. On June 24 - the second anniversary of the Dobbs v.Jackson Supreme

https://www.glocktalk.com/threads/strike-two-capability-on-glocks.929481/
I also have a Taurus PT-99AF, all the "second strike" feature really is is the ability to pull the trigger again, and the hammer will re-strike the firing pin, it can be a DA pull, or you can manually cock the hammer and fire it SA ... Oh yes, the all important second strike capability. :whistling: certified gun nut. Save Share.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/the-best-165hz-monitors-for-gaming-in-2024/ar-AA1ekwa9
A 165Hz monitor is worthless if your gaming rig can't consistently push 165 frames per second (FPS). This 27-inch 1440p IPS display offers the optimal screen size and resolution for a 165Hz gaming