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36,017 Views • Aug 20, 2020 • Click to toggle off description
Video about Counterexamples: • What is a Counterexample? (and why ph...
This is a video lecture about Hilary Putnam's seminal paper "Brains and Behavior". The Super Spartans example and the x-world (or x-worlders) example are both discussed, as are how those examples are meant to present a problem for the logical behaviorist theory of mind. This is part of an introductory level philosophy course, Introduction to Philosophy.
Views : 36,017
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Date of upload: Aug 20, 2020 ^^
Rating : 4.945 (13/927 LTDR)
RYD date created : 2022-01-24T19:02:02.496442Z
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YouTube Comments - 111 Comments
Top Comments of this video!! :3
As an example of the opposite type of counterexample where the disposition to act a certain way is there but the mental state is not, consider the case of a psychopath who feels no concern for other humans but learns to act as though he does to fit in socially. If he never reveals this, then clearly he is disposed to act as though he cares for other people even though there is no corresponding mental state.
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Really enjoy your videos, please keep making them... you deserve more subs.
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This is so well explained - and as usual without taking sides on whichever arguments are being presented. Thank you
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Many thanks for your contribution to our knowledge, send from Belgium.
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Mental concepts are the 4th of the 5 clusters (skandhas) in Buddhist psychology. Cluster 1 is sensory data of the peripheral nervous system. Cluster 2 is the mental reception of the sensory data in the brain. Cluster 3 is the initial distinction-making forming the mental perceptions. Cluster 4 is the formation of concepts from the perceptions. Cluster 5 is the field of the cluster of self-consciousness that arises from the interplay of the first four clusters.
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Behaviourism: "the mental state of pain is the disposition to cry"
Putnam: "behaviourism must be false given that one might feel pain and yet always smile indifferently"
Possible counter argument from behaviourism to Putnam's counter example: but why would smiling indifferently as response to pain be considered less of a disposition than crying? After all, the decision to bottle up the pain is a decision, a way of behaving just as much as venting your pain is
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Great. As usual.
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This is so helpful.
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The counter argument put forth by Putnam, while logical within its context creates minds that are not human; or humans whose minds are inhibited by genetics or disease. This assumes that pain serves a purpose, and that suppressing pain also serves a purpose, but when suppression reduces reproductive success (an having no pain would lead to death) then it can no longer be considered possible (Leprosy would be an example of not feeling pain; it is a disease that has impacted the person, now curable, but in the past it would increase the chances of death).
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I love this content! But I have a real problem with Putnam's argument. When we're talking about mind, I can only assume we're talking about the mind of Homo sapiens and not just any conceivable mind. As it stands, super-Spartans who can somehow suppress pure agony to the point that it no longer gives them a disposition to act in a certain way are no longer human. I'm bothered by the tendency that some philosophers have to ignore bodies of knowledge from science. One might have the discipline to manage pain in a certain way, but this is not a heritable trait. If Mendel and Morgan and the physiologists who study the basis for pain were in the audience listening to Putnam, they'd all have their hands up in the air and they'd be saying "but, but, but, but!!!"
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It's awesome.thank you
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The inverted example you suggested at the end, we see everyday. It is called acting. Actors are never in pain but act as though they are.
In some ways, Putnam’s example is also about acting - being in pain but acting as if they are not.
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Seems like a 'cluster concept' would fit well with 'determinism' in that the observance of a behaviour would stem from a 'set' of all the variables factoring in as 'elements' experienced by the mind in the moment before the behaviour was exhibited.
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nice, your videos helped me a lot for my studies thank you :D
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The polio example only shows that when we discover new information, sometimes we need to change definitions or create new words to express that distinction. It does not mean that there's some mystical change in the universe or that we didn't have every reason to believe whatever we believed before.
The set of expressions a virus has is an inherent part of what it is, regardless of the fact that it overlaps with others. The problem is that we don't have a high enough resolution understanding to make that distinction apparent. The cough of virus A is not Actually identical to the cough caused by virus B, because how it came about is an inherent part of what it IS. It's not actually the same symptom, we just can't make that distinction so we understand it as a broader category - coughing.
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Considering Wittgensteins private language argument: If in the x world no one ever shows pain behaviour how would the individual x-worlder or super super spartan even know what he feels is "pain" or what kind of feelings he shouldn't show to the external world? If there is no such thing as pain expression in the x-world he wouldn't know and also wouldn't know that's the feeling he is supposed to suppress or show signs of it to the external world? So the difference between the super super spartan in the x world and the super spartan in the real world is the latter can talk about pain because in his world there is a word for it that is connected to behaviour that is at least observable in others where in the x-world there isn't so even if another individual in the x-world showed signs of pain behaviour he wouldn't even know that's pain behaviour the other person is displaying as he has no concept of it.
Really enjoyed your video, mate! Keep up the good work!
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Is any physical manifestation considered behaviour?
If so, if we have a machine that reads your brain activity and it shows through monitoring your synapses and various brainstuff that you are in fact in pain even if you are this super-super-spartan that won't admit verbally or curl up in a fetal position and so forth, is that enough to support behaviourism?
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Any question that can be understood as "what is the nature of..." is semantic.
Regarding pain, a difference that makes no difference is no difference.
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As Colin Hankin also points out here, Putnams Spartans do not affect the theory of behaviourism. Their response to pain is just different from others, but the link between mental state and behaviour remains intact.
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@JamesDauterman
1 year ago
This guy is giving a world-class education in philosophy for free. What an absolute legend
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