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114,277 Views ⢠Sep 9, 2020 ⢠Click to toggle off description
Jackson's Mary's Room & Epiphenomenalism:    â˘Â Frank Jackson's famous 'Mary's Room' ... Â
This is a lecture video about "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience" by David Chalmers. In this 2002 article from Scientific American, Chalmers distinguishes the easy problems of consciousness from what he calls the hard problem of consciousness. He explains how there are three broad responses to the hard problem (optimistic reductionism, mysterianism, and dualism, though he does not use the term "dualism"), and how all current neuropsychological research only attempts to solve the easy problems. There is also discussion of potential psychophysical laws. This is part of an introductory philosophy course.
Views : 114,277
Genre: Education
Date of upload: Sep 9, 2020 ^^
Rating : 4.92 (52/2,545 LTDR)
RYD date created : 2022-02-08T19:46:28.748583Z
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YouTube Comments - 522 Comments
Top Comments of this video!! :3
Love your classes đ It would be great if you reviewed this lecture to include Kastrup and Hoffmanâs theory of Analytic Idealism which substantially advances metaphysics aligning it with new quantum theories and geometries
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I deeply enjoy your presentations! Thank you for explaining so thoroughly and, when possible, visually, these notoriously difficult topics!
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Thank you for a clear explanation of the hard problem. There is an explanation that âsolvesâ it though (please bear with me). Here is a brief summary:
1) First person subjective consciousness is the one irrefutable fact of reality. Remember, illusions are also 1st person subjective experiences.
2) Objective phenomena (world, others, even self) are appearances within consciousness. They may or may not have reality outside of consciousness, outside of appearance.
3) Objective (physical) reality is a closed system, and thus has no apparent use and no apparent explanation for subjective consciousness.
4) Therefore, the most logical explanation for reality is a form of idealism in which the stuff of realty is experience, and objective phenomena are law-governed appearances or illusions.
There are definitely esthetic concerns with this explanation ( for example, itâs not obvious how more than one actual subject is involved. âOthersâ in this scenario are âjust â appearances also.
So much more to discuss, but thatâs the basic idea, and Iâd love to hear logical objections to it.
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What value in a clever clear-thinking teacher. I'm not the shiniest penny in the till but while Kaplan's presentation is less than 30 minutes, he was able to get across a complex topic even I could grasp. No mean feat.
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Ty for the excellent presentation. It was recommended by a teacher of advaita vedanta who has referred to Chalmers in a lecture about Consciousness and a logical flaw in The Hard Problem approach.
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I'm immensely entertained by the way you introduce deeply complex and cutting edge material and immediately drop "whatever" afterwards, because the details aren't meaningfully informative upon the thing being considered and it's exactly the point at which my brain is coming to that conclusion.
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Thank you so much. I really like how you explain things
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I like to think that the brain is an abstraction machine. A processor connected to a sensory apparatus. The sensory apparatus includes input and output as well as storage and is all an abstraction of the interaction experience.
Without the extraction of the sensory apparatus structure the processor function could not work as there would be no data.
Cognative function only begins when the initial sensory stimuli is received. This function begins building sets based on experiences and abstraction of comparative elements.
The abstraction of these sets continues to build models to understand and interact with the stimuli. This is the begining of conciousness. There are many model sets being built, allowing the sophistication of an intellect and personality of the individual to grow. There is a plataeu based on requirement of abstraction the individual needs in their enviorment, habit of abstraction and interest in learning or discovering things.
This seems to reflect in an individual based on the regular interactive cohorts they keep, and activities they take part in or not. So change the enviorment change the mind.
This may not remain my theory if I get feedback that helps me move to a better model or reconcille it to somewhere inbetween. I just think it seems to fit quite well as a process.
It is something that came to me when pondering Rene Descartes 'I think therefore I am', and applying concepts of everything being a function to a non well founded universal set model. The idea was how cognition begins, how sets would be formed. I concluded that whilst the thinker could not be sure of anything about themselves they could be sure of the following. That any cognition that occurs would require an abstraction apparatus regardless of form, that any cognition receiving data could gain enough sophistication to identify the 'function set model'. That all ideas sit in the universal set model and that includes the well founded set models. That the reality of the situation must exist as a set model, even if the thinking mind can not find it. That the mind can abstract a model adequate enough to be a non well founded set within the reality set model they are experiencing with some well founded sets inside that greater model. That this is adequate enough for the interactions the mind perceives are taking place, provided the mind continues the quest for understanding.
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That was awesome. Thank you for making such efforts to educate people. Would love to hear more about David Chalmers and Dualism.
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You Are Your Brain & Your Brain Is You ;
We have yet to find evidence that it's possible, for a "conscience thinking mind" to exist, without a "living functioning brain".
If your memories & personality are separate from your brain, (in a soul), then they would not be effected by damage to the brain. (but they are)
Even though we don't know the exact process by which consciousness arises, it is still undeniable that it is a brain process that can't occur, separate from the brain.
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Roger Penrose spoke about this lack of knowledge about consciousness. He mentioned a few things we know about. For instance that we know how to turn it off with sedatives and that it seems to originate on the surface of neurons.
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Experiments in the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research department showed there is some crossover/overlap between the conscious & physical worlds, although small. This would tend against dualism/epiphenomenalism, rather supporting panpsychism or panprotopsychism.
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@14:56 Offering up a theory, the neurons are repeating a pattern of complex sensory experience. For the structure of the individual brain there is a semi variable pattern of how the brain experiences sensory data, depending on the stage of neuron reproduction. This shows in structural variablility within the larger fixed structure in individual brains.
So one sensory experience has multiple elements within that experience. The brain processing elements of experience attempts to repeat the partial abstract experience of the greater pattern. The brain when thinking can replicate elements from different patterns to form new patterns. The growth of experience is the growth of pattern vocabulary. So thinking is determined by both apparatus and experienced enviorment. A brain is an situational adaptor through these abstractions and can only improve through experience and reflection.
Experience of a pattern can degrade as the brain replicates the pattern less often and this is why memory is imperfect.
Brain damage results in a change of thinking because it prevents replication of patterns of experience. The structure of the brain is changed even in healing and may become unable to fully complete the experienced pattern or find a new experience adaptation.
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Isn't there another option besides physicalism and dualism? What about idealism â the theory that consciousness is fundamental and physical bodies are illusory? I'm thinking of the Analytic Idealism proposed by, for example, Bernardo Kastrup.
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Thank you for laying out so clearly Chalmer's article, must admit he was brilliant creating the circular reasoning in positing the hard problem and proposing a dualist solution so that the hard problem will forever remain hard and "unsolved", a gordian knot.
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But if Epiphenomenalism is true, how come weâre able to describe that weâre conscious? If consciousness has no way of interacting with your physical brain, why does your physical brain know that you are conscious? How is it able to contemplate consciousness and talk about it with others when, if epiphenomenalism is to be believed, the physical brain itself does not experience or even know it is conscious. To experience is to interact, for us to know the existence of anything we must be able to interact in any way with it, including conscious. If consciousness really was a byproduct that never interacted with the physical world, weâd still feel stuff but the brain would never have a reason to talk about consciousness. You may say that itâs a coincidence that the physical brain believes itself to be conscious but itâs a very unlikely coincidenceness. The idea of consciousness occurring to an unconscious brain would be like the colour red occurring to a brain that canât process red. And how is it able to accurately talk about consciousness? As if itâs experienced it itself.
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1. The brain is a prediction machine. At multiple levels.
2. Most of what the brain 'does' is 'emergent behaviour', (that is it is unintuitively different than the sum of its inputs).
3. Therefore, my brain is constantly having to predict what I am going to feel and do next.
4. As my brain gets better at predicting me, it also gets better at predicting others, which in a social species is highly adaptive.
5. "What it's like" to be doing this all the time gives rise to the internal monlogue, the story telling, and ultimately the impression that mind feels like a separate thing.
So it's Optimistic Reductionism, if we can work out how to work backwards from emergent behaviour to underlying cause, and Mysterianism, if we can't.
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In order to understand anything, one must be able to define it. If you cannot define it, you cannot study it. This is why the study of âconsciousnessâ is so difficult. And yet, we have a sense of consciousness, as argued by Thomas Nagel in âWhat it is like to be a batâ. Everyone understands what the term âconsciousnessâ refers to; generally in the context of âwhat something is likeâ. That is how we think - by comparing this to that: our memories of bats, knowledge of hearing and echo-location, etc. The neurophysiology of understanding the brain mechanisms underlying those processes is the âeasyâ problem - the âwhatnessâ of consciousness. Consciousness itself can be considered as the âfieldâ of those comparisons. Consider riding in a train, looking out the window, seeing people, houses, cows, whatever. Consciousness is just looking out the window. When you realize you are conscious it is because you recognize something, say a car. Your brain has compared what you see to your memory and decided either you know what it is or you donât. What has happened is you have âsplitâ your mind into 2 parts - a recollection (comparison with some stored memories) versus a current perception. That process results in an event that is neither past nor present; it cannot be defined, yet the result is definitely an experience. But while you may remember the result, you do not remember experiencing the result: thus the experience of recognition is not defineable. That doesnât mean we canât call it something. We call it âconsciousnessâ. You can know what you know, and you can know what you donât know, but you canât know what you canât know. What you canât know is consciousness.
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i love hearing this in my right ear <3
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@kevinalmgren8332
7 months ago
Iâm commenting on an old video, but I just found this channel. I used to believe that consciousness was independent from the physical world. Then, I had a traumatic brain injury from a severe impact, which caused a fundamental change to my personality and my conception of my self. Basically, it felt like a change to my âsoul,â whatever that is. I realized later on that we are far more physical creatures than I believed. If a hard hit to the head can change the way we understand and see the world and ourselves, then that implies to me that consciousness is a physical process that can be affected by physical events. This would be hard to research, as most ethicists would be opposed to deliberately causing brain damage to subjects to uncover the specific effects that trauma does to the human psyche.
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